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MISCELLANEOUS
1. PRIORITY OF ATTORNEY FEES
Standard Savings & Loan Association v. Evans' was an action by
a first mortgagee against the mortgagor and the United States, as
second mortgagee, to foreclose a mortgage. The Richland County
Common Pleas Court held that the first mortgagee's attorney fees
should be paid before the second mortgage debt. The United States,
representing the Small Business Administration, appealed, and the de-
cision was affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The United States argued that the mortgage lien against the prop-
erty was a prior claim to the attorney's fee and that the Federal com-
mon law rule of "first-in-time, first-in-right" was applicable.' The
court stated that the cases cited by the government were decided prior
to the Federal Tax Lien Act3 which makes local law applicable as to
priorities. In interpreting this Act the lower court held:
The new Federal Tax Lien Act, which became effective November
2, 1966, extends the priority of plaintiff's mortgage to include not
only the debt and interest, but also taxes, attorneys' fees, cost of
property insurance and costs of the action. The local law now
prevails as to priority.
4
The court's ruling was consistent with Ault v. Harris5 which
applied the rule established by Congress in tax cases to a similar
situation. Ault found that local law prevails, and "[tihere is no ques-
tion but under local South Carolina law' the first mortgage attorney
fee ranks prior to the second mortgage debt." 7
11. HAIR LENGTH REGULATIONS
Rumler v. Board of School Trustees' was an action instituted to
obtain a preliminary injunction with respect to school district regula-
I. 255 S.C. 207, 178 S.E.2d 145 (1970). ,
2. United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 384 U.S. 323 (1966); United
States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
3. 26 U.S.C. 6323 (1967).
4. 255 S.C. at 210, 178 S.E.2d at 146.
5. 317 F. Supp. 373, affd, 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-55 (1962).
7. 255 S.C. at 210, 178 S.E.2d at 147.
8. 437 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1971).
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tions regarding hair length of male students. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated that since the students had cut their hair and had
been readmitted to school, they did not show a case of irreparable
injury necessary for granting an injunction. Without reaching the mer-
its of the restrictive regulation, the court affirmed the district court's
denial of injunction.
This was the first hair length case to reach the Fourth Circuit, and
it came before the court factually undeveloped. It seems inevitable that
in the future this court will have the opportunity to decide whether a
student's decision as to hair length is a fundamental, constitutionally
protected right that need not yield to school regulation. This question
has been presented to four circuit courts 9 across the nation and the
results are divided.
The primary determinations which had to be made by the courts
were whether a student's decision to wear his hair long is a constitution-
ally protected right, and secondly, whether the state presents sufficient
evidentiary justification to infringe on that right. In considering these
questions, only Jackson v. Dorrier10 rejected completely the proposition
that students have a constitutionally protected right to wear their hair
at any length or in any manner. In Richards v. Thurston" the court
found this right to be one of personal liberty established by the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment, believing that:
'[l]iberty' seems . . . an incomplete protection if it encom-
passes only the right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free
to interfere with those personal aspects of our lives which have no
direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their liberty.'2
The opinion of the court in Crews v. Cloncs" stated it was an ingredient
of personal freedom because it is one of those additional constitutional
rights not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights. The Crews court
found justification for its position in history, quoting the Supreme
Court:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
9. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (lst Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424
F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969); Ferrell v. Dallas
Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
10. 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970).
II. 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
12. Id. at 1284-85.
13. 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
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possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au-
thority of law. 1
After a personal right has been determined to exist, the school
board must show a state interest justifying its intrusion on this right.
The nature of the liberty and the context in which it is asserted must
be considered along with the extent to which the intiusion is confined
to legitimate public interest to be served. To satisfy this substantial
burden of justification, school boards have presented various reasons
for their regulations, which include: i) Long hair distracts fellow stu-
dents from their work; 2) Students whose appearance conforms to
community standards perform better in school; and 3) Long hair is a
health and safety problem.
It is interesting to note that . . . virtually no school board has
placed reliance on the educational per se function as a justification
for such regulations. . . . This undoubtedly reflects the general
distaste in our society for coercive education per se rules except
those regulating affirmative student conduct that takes place on
school grounds, conduct for which there is a sense of immediate
school board responsibility. . . .5
Several of the courts, as in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School
District,6 which have found the school board justification sufficient,
relied on prior disturbances and problems during school hours caused
by unusual hair styles. The courts standing against the restrictive regu-
lations have held either explicitly or implicitly that school authorities
failed to carry their burden of substantial justification. In Crews the
court stated that action should be taken to punish those students who
cause disruptions, and in Breen v. Kahl" the court agreed, choosing to
align itself with Judge Tuttle's dissenting opinion in Ferrell:
[wie find courts too prone to permit a curtailment of a constitu-
tional right of a dissenter, because of the likelihood that it will
bring disorder, resistance or improper and even violent action by
those supporting the status quo. . . . [clonstitutional rights of an
14. Id. at 1264, quoting from Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891).
15. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373,
399-401 (1969).
16. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968). The majority seemed to rest its affirmance partly
on availability of wigs for these students who were in a band.
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individual cannot be denied him because his exercise of them pro-
duces violent reaction by those who would deprive him of the very
rights he seeks to assert.'
In similar cases in the future, the Fourth Circuit will have the
opportunity to decide whether the hair length regulations are a justifia-
ble intrusion on a student's personal liberty. It seems that only if the
regulation in question is backed by a substantial justification, can it
stand as an adequate countervailing interest. A regulation should not
stand just to compel conformity to conventional standards because as
stated by the Breen court: "Discipline for the sake of discipline and
uniformity is indeed not compatible with the melting pot formula
which brought this country to greatness." 19
III. GRANTING OF CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
Carolina Pipeline Co. v. South Carolina Public Service
Commission2" was an action brought by South Carolina Electric and
Gas Company on application for a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to supply natural gas throughout Georgetown county.
The Commission granted a certificate to the applicant arid revoked
Carolina's prior certificate, upon its finding that Carolina was both
unable and unwilling to provide the necessary service. Carolina ap-
pealed to the district court2 claiming confiscation of property without
due process of law and the court reversed the Commission's decision
concluding that Carolina did have the capability to provide gas service
in that area.
The Commission had granted a certificate to Carolina Pipeline in
1958, but they have never extended service to the county because man-
agement found it economically infeasible to do so without a large
industrial consumer requiring service. In 1969, Midland-Ross of Tole-
do, Ohio discussed the possibility of building a forty million dollar iron
ore plant in Georgetown. The results of meetings with Carolina indi-
cated it was unwilling to serve the potential industrial user on accepta-
ble terms, and lacked capability for meeting the industry's require-
ments for interruptible gas service.
18. 393 F.2d at 705.
19. 419 F.2d at 1038.
20. 255 S.C. 324, 178 S.E.2d 669 (1971).
21. Appeal authorized under S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-124 (1962).
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Carolina was entitled to independent judicial review of issues of
confiscation and due process, but the action of the circuit court in
substituting its judgment for that of the Commission was in opposition
to the opinion of the supreme court. 2 The action by the Commission
was authorized z  and "[tihe virtually undisputed facts which have been
stated required that it exercise this authority in the public interest." 2
The court held there was no evidence that the Commission's action
would render Carolina's plant worthless; so accordingly, the order
appealed from was reversed and that of the Commission was reinstat-
ed.
IV. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commissionz5 was an action to set aside a "demand for access
to evidence" and on the Commission's cross petition for enforcement
of its demand. After receiving sworn charges of racial discrimination
by two employees against the petitioner, the Commission obtained
information from Granitville with regard to the department in which
the employees worked. When the Commission requested evidence with
respect to all the departments at the Sibley Mill, the petitioner refused
and was served with the Demand. The district court held 21 that the
information sought by the EEOC was beyond the scope of their investi-
gatory powers, but on appeal the circuit court reversed and remanded.
Two main issues on which the majority differed with the district
court and the dissent were 1) the specificity of the employees' charge
and 2) the scope of the EEOC investigation. The petitioner contended
the charge was deficient since it contained no specific information.
Since the facts alleged were of a general and unspecified nature, the
district court held there were no specific components to which the
evidence demanded was relevant, and called for a hearing to determine
if the employee was aggrieved in terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In conducting the hearing, the court required the EEOC to show rea-
sonable cause to believe the charge was true, as a prerequisite to the
enforcement of their demand. Since the commission's investigation is
22. See Board of Bank Control v. Thomason, 236 S.C. 158, 113 S.E.2d 544 (1960).
23. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-122 (1962).
24. 255 S.C. at 334-35, 178 S.E.2d at 674.
25. 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971).
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seeking only to determine the existence of reasonable cause, the major-
ity held the district court's action to be in error. The majority reasoned
that the allegations need only be sufficient to put the respondent on
notice of the practice or violation with which it is charged; therefore, a
hearing was unnecessary.
The dispute over the scope of the EEOC's investigatory powers
was centered around the reading of the legislative history of two sec-
tions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Actof 1964.2 The majority con-
tended that these sections granted the EEOC investigatory powers
equal in scope to those granted the N.L.R.B. under the Taft-Hartley
Act.28 The court reasoned that the changes in language from the origi-
nal bill were only to emphasize the inability of the EEOC to undertake
an investigation in the absence of a previously filed charge. In contrast
to N.L.R.B. proceedings where both sides are represented by lawyers,
the EEOC has to carry the full burden of investigating minimally
informative charges filed by unrepresented lay complaintants. This fact
also persuaded the court that these broad powers of investigation were
essential to the Commission.
The dissent and district court asserted that its reading of the legis-
lative history of the Act indicated Congress carefully intended to deny
the Commission broad investigatory powers. They contended that the
original intention to conform these sections to the language of the Taft-
Hartley Act was irrelevant since that version of the Act was not passed
by Congress. The dissent was firm in its opinion that ". . . the statute
leaves much to be desired in clarity and precision, ' 29 but the sections
mean what they say, thereby significantly restricting the powers of the
EEOC.
In effect, the holding of the court allowed the EEOC to investigate
the existence of general policies and patterns of racial discrimination
in job classifications or hiring situations other than those specifically
charged by the complaintant. Since a narrow interpretation was not
given to the Act, the Commission will be able to provide relief that is
not limited to the individual interests of the charging party.3
27. The sections in dispute were Sections 709 and 710 of theAct. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1964).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1964).
29. 438 F.2d at 43, quoting from, Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 889
(9th Cir. 1969).
30. 438 F.2d at 42.
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V. INTEGRATION THROUGH FREEDOM OF CHOICE PLAN
Brunson v. Board of Trustees"' was a desegregation case instituted
to determine if the school board's Freedom of Choice Plan was an
adequate system of determining admission to public schools on a non-
racial basis. In September 1969, there were 2408 black students and
256 white students enrolled in four all black schools with two other
schools remaining virtually all-white. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the school board's freedom of choice plan had
resulted in only token desegregation; therefore, it held the plan inade-
quate and ineffective to dismantle the dual school system and establish
a unitary one. The court affirmed the district court and its approval
of the plan proposed by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare.
The dissent agreed that the plan was ineffective, but disapproved
of the proposed HEW plan, contending that it attempted too much.
Due to the ten to one ratio of black to white students and the serious
problem of white flight in this district, they felt the plan might accom-
plish "desegregation," but the result would not be "integration."32 The
dissent would have remanded the case to the district court and have
required the school board to submit a plan to provide for an undiscri-
minating racial mix in one high school and one elementary school.
In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Sobeloff, found his col-
leagues' (dissent) solution to be legally unfounded and fraught with
injurious consequences. He recognized their exposition was mainly in
connection with the "white flight" problem, but stated that ". . . the
Supreme Court has held over and over that courts must not permit
community hostility to intrude on the application of constitutional
principles."' ' a It was the intent of the dissent to restrict their proposal
to this particular district where white flight was a problem, but Judge
Sobeloff did not believe the model could be so confined, stating:
The purported restriction of the thesis to extreme white minority-
white flight situations is really no limitation at all. Rather it offers
a premium for community resistance. More to be feared than
white flight . . . would be any judicial countenancing of the
31. 429 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970).
32. Id. at 821.
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suggestion that abandoning or qualifying a desegregation program
is a legally acceptable way to discourage flight. For once this tactic
were sanctioned. . . . its insidious example would be followed by
other school boards hostile to desegregation, with resulting wide-
spread frustration of the unitary school principle.34
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